Creating Modern Cityscapes and Modern Civilians: The Urban Planning Law and the 1927 Hikoso Fire Reconstruction in Kanazawa

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A fire swept through a large section of Kanazawa in 1927. In its wake it left not only destruction, but also an opportunity for the city to introduce a new Urban Planning Law and educate its citizens to the benefits of this new law and the modern urban spaces it facilitated. The need to rebuild carried with it a chance to foster the emergence of “ideal citizens” (risō shimin). This essay examines how newly created spaces were used to elicit civilian compliance, and how the vision of a “new Kanazawa” was promoted to a people who yearned for their city to return to its former prominence. I focus on the role of the city government, contrasting local agency and initiative with national government direction in the realm of urban planning. After discussing the introduction of the Urban Planning Law and the image of the city that prevailed in Kanazawa before the fire, I analyze how civilian cooperation was gained, with particular regard to issues of rebuilding after the fire and the impact of restrictions contained in the new law. Finally, I offer a brief consideration of how local groups put pressure on the city government to extend one main thoroughfare to the poorer Ward Seven across the river, an action that demonstrates how a law regarded as authoritarian was in fact amenable to compromise and local considerations.

Keywords: urban planning, regional development, residential awareness, Kanazawa, city, modern cityscape, citizenship

Introduction

The physical space of the city makes “visible the invisible.” That is, urban space reveals the power structures of the state and the requirements of citizenship it demands. Thus architecture and the arrangement of space are key elements in the creation of the modern nation-state, and the relationships that they manifest are especially notable in Japan, where late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century changes were so rapid.
It is well established that the modern nation-state used symbolic power to increase actual power. Recent studies such as Takashi Fujitani’s analysis of the symbols of imperial power in the Meiji state have shown that Japan was no outlier in this regard. Writing about Kanazawa, Ishikawa prefecture, Motoyasu Hiroshi has also noted how “there was a need to appeal more directly to emotional and sensory elements in order to ensure the acceptance among the masses of the appropriateness of the power of, and the physicality of, the modern nation-state and citizen.” Motoyasu explains how “the existence of specific military memorial facilities acted as catalysts to spiritually enforce the idea of militarism in civilian thought even in peacetime,” stressing the link between the visual environment or urban structure, and residential thought. Not just sacred space (irei kūkan) such as Motoyasu describes, but physical space in general has the ability to make visible the invisible, to demonstrate directly the power government exercises through its actions to control the physical environment. This is the same idea as lies behind the grand vistas of Baroque Europe, and with the same purpose.

Urban planning was practiced not only for the immediate and practical advantages of improved urban design, but in order to sell residents on the desirability of the modern state and its rule. Even decades after the Meiji Restoration, despite the progress in industry and economy, Japanese city form outside the major centers was often little changed from the Edo period. For the role of city space as a vehicle to “teach the rules and limitations” of modern urban society, premodern city space was an anachronism, and a handicap. To create the ideal citizen, ideal urban space was required; the ideal urban environment would directly affect the views of the residents with regard to their responsibilities under the new order. Form became ideology made visible, and images of the ideal city were used to create a new civilian consciousness of the modern. The relationship between the urban elite and the newly-emerging middle classes, almost exclusively urban, played a large role in the ways in which cities developed and the ideals and goals to which they aspired. It was important to convince increasingly-politicized urban residents of the importance and desirability of the goals of the urban elite, whether in terms of industry, trade, or infrastructure. For that reason, urban development goals were expressed in terms of their benefit for the residents, in order to co-opt their support and increase their feelings of civic patriotism.

After a devastating fire in 1927, the Urban Planning Law (toshi keikaku hō) was applied expressly in order to achieve these goals in the reconstruction of the Hikoso area of Kanazawa (see maps, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). The rebuilding of this part of town was designed as a showpiece of modern urban planning ideals to provide a concrete—in the literal as well as figurative sense—example of the benefits of the new law and the new ambitions of urban development. Because of the need to make the reconstruction conform to the new law, and because this would mean changes for land owners and local residents, it was particularly important for city planners to convince people of the benefits of the new law and design ideas. Planners needed the property holders and residents to accept a time delay following the fire before they were permitted to rebuild; planners also desired assent to the radical changes in land use that the city’s plan required. How this was achieved is the focus of this essay.

While there are many factors to be considered in looking into the questions of urban planning development and urban reconstruction, such as financial and economic, or the relations between landowners and the lower-class renters, this essay takes as its focus the
rhetorical and intellectual aspects of urban redevelopment under the Urban Planning Law. I approach the topic from the point of view of urban image theory and the ideals and development goals of the urban elite. Two groups deserve particular attention in the Kanazawa case: one is the city office and council, together with the urban planning committee (toshi keikaku iinkai 都市計画委員会), made up of city and prefectural councillors, and the other is the local residents. While Andre Sorensen states that it is “hard to overstate the degree of central
government dominance in the period before the Second World War,” in actuality the city office was no mere transmitter of central government plans. Certainly the Kanazawa city office had its own ideas and concepts, and its actions show that the Urban Planning Law was by no means universalist and centralized, but flexible and adaptable to local needs. Nor were local residents content to sit back and allow the government to control everything; they were active in participating in the planning process, using media and local government representatives to achieve their goals. The thinking of both city government and local residents was most clearly expressed in discussions over extending a road, Route 2 (dainigō-sen 第二号線), that although heading directly for the bridge to the far bank of the river, stopped short of it, trickling into a much narrower street. I will touch on the discourse regarding this road at the end of this essay.

Pre-Shōwa Urban Image

Divided as they were into commoners’ areas and samurai areas, Japanese castle towns developed during the Edo period as highly specialized urban spaces. Aside from a few main streets, largely in the merchant or temple areas, the majority of roads in castle towns were little more than access routes to residential areas, and thus no wider than they had to be. The width of roads varied from 3 ken (about 5.5 meters; 1 ken is 1.818 meters) to 4.5 ken (7.3 meters) along the Hokkoku-kaidō 北国街道, with other main routes averaging 2.3 ken (4.1 meters), and minor routes averaging 1.5 ken (2.8 meters). In samurai areas, the road width was directly proportional to the rank of samurai, with roads facing residences of the principal retainers (the “Eight Houses” or hakka 八家) being two ken. However, what worked in the Edo period did not work in the post-Restoration period when streets came to be used more and more for cross-urban transit.

An early example of the problems with old road widths occurred in the Meiji period. The Imperial Japanese Army, which had chosen Kanazawa as the base of its Ninth Division in 1898, with division headquarters on the old Maeda castle site, required the city to widen the route between its training camps and the train station to a minimum of two ken. In 1899, local residents complained that “soldiers who have finally managed to negotiate the dangerous slope of Saigawa Shinbashi 犀川新橋 find themselves almost unable to pass along the road between Shin Tatemachi 新竪町 and Hyakushō-machi 百姓町, and because the road is so narrow shop displays outside are often damaged.”

The complaint that Kanazawa roads were narrow and twisted (kyōai 狹隘) was a common one from the late Meiji to the early Shōwa period. This comment from the Hokkoku shinbun 北國新聞 is typical: “[Kanazawa is] a city boasting 150,000 people, the largest city on the Japan Sea coast, yet its roads are narrow and twisted and irregular, causing visitors from other areas to come away with the impression that we all rub shoulders on the street.” Kanazawa’s road network was indeed much more labyrinthine than most other castle towns, due to its size, rapid early growth, and geography, but this editorial from the region’s leading newspaper points to another key aspect of Kanazawa’s urban image: its concern for how the city appeared to outsiders. This was characteristic of the time Japanese researchers have called the “inter-city rivalry period” (toshi-kan kyōsō jidai 都市間競争時代), and the concern about appearances was particularly strong in Kanazawa, which took pride in having
been the castle town of the million-koku fief of the Maeda family, the richest daimyo of the Tokugawa era after the shogun himself.

While it is difficult to gauge the zeitgeist of ordinary residents regarding the city’s modernization, there are a few ways we can get some understanding. For example, in early 1925 the Hokkoku shinbun took the unusual step of soliciting readers’ views on the subject of what to do with the Kanazawa castle site once the military had been removed. The responses give us some insight into how the average resident felt about urban identity and modernization. While there was broad-based support for opening the site up as a park and making it the centerpiece of a “Great Kanazawa,” there were several comments that touched on the “exhaustion” of modernization and wanted the castle site to serve a symbolic purpose as a spiritual center of the city (shimin no seishinteki tōitsu 市民の精神的統一)—either as a shrine to the war dead (chūkonsha 忠魂社) or as the home of a “detached palace” (rikyū 離宮) for the emperor. As the former home of the Maeda lords, the castle was long “a locus of regional peoples’ veneration, and thus even in these days of [ever-changing] cultural trends any usage that went against those principles would be damaging to civilian morality.” A shrine or other sacred space would provide an untouchable core to the city, a lodestone of morality that drew upon both regional and national ideologies to control citizenry and bulwark the modern state against the pressures of change. Thus while there was a definite enthusiasm for Kanazawa’s modernization, there were also significant elements of concern for the pace at which it was happening and the unity of the populace.

The Introduction of the Urban Planning Law in Kanazawa

The first modern Urban Planning Law in Japan was passed in 1919, a modification of the existing Tokyo City Reform Code (Tōkyō shiku kaisei jōrei 東京市区改正条例). Originally designed to transform Tokyo into an imperial capital, the City Reform Code had not contained solutions to the increasing pressures of the modern city, and was progressively less and less adequate for coping with the demands of modern city development—leading to a situation characterized by Ishizuka Hiromichi 石塚裕道 as “urban ‘un’-planning.”

The system provided by the Urban Planning Law was often criticised as being “tyrannical and dictatorial.” However, Ikeda Hiroshi 池田宏, who drafted the law, was at pains to note that, though admittedly centralist, the law was designed to ensure “respect [of] the authority of each local body, while tackling the myriad issues of conflict between national and local policies in the case of urban problems, to create a buffer zone, and while respecting both central and local authority, find cooperative solutions and improve the quality of city life.” One of the crucial perceptions of Ikeda and other framers of institutions for city planning was that “however no matter how perfect the urban planning may be, without the support of the law, and without strong commitment from the citizens, it is impossible to successfully undertake.” The importance of civilian compliance received an early emphasis, an emphasis that that would be a major aspect of the implementation of the law in Kanazawa.

Kanazawa and the Urban Planning Law

In 1918 the Hokkoku shinbun ran a number of articles about the upcoming Urban Planning Law and its proposed implementation in Kanazawa. “While the urgency of reforming
the main centers is recognized,” one of these articles warned, “the present economic growth involves rapid industrialization nationwide and the commensurate urban development of numerous medium-sized to small centers; if said centers are not planned from the outset to accommodate growth, they will end up like present-day Tokyo and Osaka with their unnatural growth.”

There was considerable debate both in the media and the city council about the likelihood of Kanazawa being chosen as one of the initial cities to be covered by the law; with hindsight it seems obvious that it would not have been overlooked, as it was still one of the ten biggest cities in Japan, but this was not self-evident at the time. As it developed, following the Official Submissions of the Tokyo Urban Planning Committee on 20 April 1923, nineteen cities, including Kanazawa, were to be initially covered by the Urban Planning Law.

The *Hokkoku shinbun*’s editorial of 6 June 1923 discussed the new law at some length, going into the early development of planning in Europe and the way modern American planned cities were not good models for more organic Japanese cities; finally, the editorial took note of the common worry of the urban elite, stating that “if the civilian population’s understanding of Urban Planning is inadequate, then Urban Planning will be seen as an attack on their present living rights, and make practical application of the work most problematic indeed.” As part of the education process, the Urban Study Group (Toshi Kenkyū Kai 都市研究会) held a series of lectures around the country to promote urban planning. To that end, on 19 June 1923, Gotō Shinpei 後藤新平, the former Mayor of Tokyo (December 1920–April 1923) and the Chairman of the Urban Study Group, arrived in Kanazawa to give a public lecture at the Town Hall. Gotō’s public lecture started at six o’clock that night, and even before it began there was “a great crush of people and the hall was filled to bursting.” The popularity of this event is evidence of considerable interest in urban planning on the part of the city residents.

According to Gotō, one of the major problems facing Kanazawa was that it “attained the greatest glory of any city under the shogunate, thus is not an easy city to change, due to its still-strong natural energies.” Gotō directly contrasted the long, settled, history of Kanazawa with new and modern colonial cities, where populations were recent and transient. This meant that, unlike colonial cities, “people have lived here for generations, thus allowing us to think seriously about urban reform and urban planning.” Here Gotō was appealing directly to civic pride, claiming that that is what will make urban planning possible. He continued in the same vein: “[T]hat the native power that must bring forth self-government power superior to other cities is something the citizens of Kanazawa must have, and in fact I believe that the citizens of Kanazawa do indeed possess this.” Gotō went on to discuss the creation of the modern citizen, saying that the legalistic government emanating from the city administration and council are not true “government” [“self-government”], but rather that the “instinctive government” arising outside this law-based government is the true “government”; that “instinctive government is based on a foundation of moral and ethical principles, and legal government is based on a foundation of rights and duties.”

These statements were designed to stimulate the residential population, and increase their acceptance of Urban Planning in a way that made legal or state law seem like an extension of what he termed natural or instinctive law. In other words, in order to make Urban Planning a success, cooperative moral principles must take precedence over legalistic ideas of rights. The individual must make sacrifices for the good of the whole—regardless of what ac-
tual political rights he might have. Regarding this, as Nogawa Yasuharu 能川泰治 has noted, "the government principles that Gotō and his followers in the civil bureaucracy promoted were designed to be reinforced through family life and local neighborhood activities [thus] attaining a 'citizen' model that internalized this idea of government principles." There was a clear idea of using this idea of government principles to promote Urban Planning. Gotō further claimed that if it was not possible to "reach an ideal of self-government", then "it would be impossible to avoid creating basic flaws in Urban Planning itself." How this view would come to affect the way in which Kanazawa carried out its first major urban planning project is the subject of the first part of this essay.

The Hikoso Fire and its Aftermath

At about 3:36 in the morning of 21 April 1927, a fire broke out in the residential area of Hikoso-machi 彦三町, near the commercial Musashigatsuji 武蔵ヶ辻 area of Kanazawa. The wind that had been blowing since the previous evening, strong enough to "blow tiles off roofs," fanned a fire that broke out at the home of Tomita Kiyokata 富田清方, a general merchant (zakkashō 雑貨商) in Yokoyasue-chō 横安江町, a commercial street just to the west of Hikoso. The cause of the fire was suspected to be an electrical fault, as there was no fire in the house at the time. Two local fire stations responded to the alarm bells, but the fire was already beyond the power of their pumps to put out. The south-west wind rapidly spread it over a wide area, destroying some five hundred residences over about 162,000 square meters of the city. At its peak, over two thousand firefighters and nearly a thousand army personnel were involved in fighting the conflagration. At about 5:00 in the morning the wind finally died down, and it began to rain, allowing the firemen finally to extinguish the flames at about 6:40 in the morning. The chaos and confusion of the fire is vividly depicted in Yonezawa Hiroyasu’s diary (see Fig. 2 for locations):

I was awakened by the sound of fire engine sirens at about four a.m., and could tell there was a fire. I got ready, and, knowing how dangerous a fire could be in a strong wind, went to the back door. Looking out, I could see the direction of Hikoso or Yasue-chō was bright red, and thought "Oh my God. This is going to be major," and ran. Heading towards Yasue-chō, I could see that the fire was in Yokoyasue-chō. I went to Mr. Kawabe’s place and got on the roof to watch. The fire spread as I watched. The fire had spread to the back street of Mr. Kawabe’s place, so I helped take all the goods to my friend in Ishiya lane’s place. We took out everything from the shop. Then four hoses were taken into the back street and I decided it was going to be safe, so next I headed towards Seventh Street [7–banchō] to Mr. Yoshimura’s place. On the way I passed along Fukuro-machi to check up on Mr. Itō, and met up with Mr. Tamai. We ran together towards Seventh Street, but it was already in flames. We dashed down Hikoso Fifth Street [5–banchō] and when we passed out from behind the Commercial School to Hyōtan-machi, in front of the school, to go to Mr. Yasue’s place, fire came up behind us and we were in the thick of the firefighting. I helped with getting the tools out and taking them to the sports field of the school, and together we were somehow able to stop the fire coming up after us. I popped in to see Mr. Kobayashi in Gohō-machi and then Mr. Tamai and I ran along
to Little Bridge [Kobashi] intending to go to Hikoso First Street [1–banchō], but the fire had come as far as the hill to First Street. Higashi-Baba was burning as well. I’m not sure how it did it, but it crossed the Asano river and I was left stunned by its speed. What had happened to Mr. Miyazaki in First Street? At this rate, it looked to be in the middle of the flames. I thought it a great pity, but there was nothing I could do. I decided to go and see after the fire had finished, and from Higashi Baba I went to the Middle Bridge. Here I got separated from Mr. Tamai. There were pumps on Little Bridge and Middle Bridge, spraying water. The rain became much harder than it had been when I was at Mr. Yasue’s place, and was now a downpour, and the wind had subsided a bit. At about seven apparently the fire died out, and I went back to Little Bridge and up to First Street. The power lines were [all over the road] like an iron net, and it was very hard to walk. The smoke was billowing thickly up,
and I couldn't open my mouth or eyes. Eventually I reached Mr. Miyazaki's house, but there was nothing left but ashes.25

There were several causes of the fire's spread. Aside from the strong wind,26 there was a lack of readily-available water for the fire pumps, and, and as the editorial in the Hokkoku shinbun the next day made clear, a crucial issue was the “narrow streets” (dōro kyōai 道路狭隘).27 The area affected was primarily middle-class housing, relatively new residences that had been constructed to fill in the abandoned samurai estates. Some three thousand people lost their homes, and 733 houses were burnt to the ground. It was the most devastating fire to hit Kanazawa since 1759,28 but despite this, only one fatality was recorded. The fire department criticized the actions of those people who just evacuated their own possessions and left the fire to burn even higher, blaming this behavior on “either big-city thinking (tokai shisō 都會思想) or individualism.”29

The financial damage of the fire was considerable. Insurance losses alone were estimated to be around ¥1,500,000, from around 400 claims (including the ¥50,000 claim of Kinjō Hospital).30 This was an amount roughly equivalent to the city's Ordinary Budget.31 An investigation by the Tamagawa police department (the controlling police district for the area) regarding losses for each area showed a total loss of a staggering ¥3,321,000, of which nearly half, ¥1,500,000, was from Yokoyasue-chō alone. Yokoyasue-chō in fact was one of the richer districts in the city, rated between 5 and 6 (out of 70) on the city's Housing Tax (kaoku zei 家屋税) scale, making it fairly well off. In contrast, the Hikoso areas, as well as Higashi-Baba across the river, were rated at from 22 to 32 or 33.32

The day after the fire, the city government immediately began drawing up plans for incorporating Hikoso in its urban design plans and making it a showcase for the new Urban Planning Law.33 The centerpiece of this grand design was to be a wide straight road, 12 ken (21.8 meters) in width, running from the commercial area of Musashigatsuji straight across existing road networks, crossing the Asano River 浅野川, and connecting up with the Ward Seven area to the north—ultimately, to the Hokkoku-kaidō, the main route through the city (see Fig. 2). This would be the widest road in the city at the time. Another wide road was planned to come up from the station area to the west and intersect with the “twelve-ken road,” as it was commonly referred to in the media, and join up with an existing bridge across the river. The second main road, known either as the “ten-and-a-half ken road” (19.1 meters) or Route 2, was required by the central government to improve station access. This did not mean it was accepted unconditionally in Kanazawa, however; several members of the Kanazawa urban planning committee voiced their objection to the road. The Hokkoku shinbun gave voice to these objections in early May, noting that although everyone was in favour of the twelve-ken road (Route 1), Route 2 was more problematic. While the Home Ministry claimed it would benefit Kanazawa's future urban planning, the planned Route 2 did not, the paper said, appear to be an important link and that it would be far in the future before it ever became useful.34 Although it took a while for the debate to die down,35 and the existence of the debate demonstrates that not even central government directives were unchallenged, there is no record of the challenge having widespread support, unlike the Route 7 extension/widening debate discussed later.

While Route 2 was laid out by the Home Ministry (naimushō 内務省), the centerpiece of the remodelling, Route 1, had been part of the city's planning from before the fire, and for
the city government this was a heaven-sent opportunity to actually realize their ambitions. As the Hokkoku shinbun noted on the 23rd, this was nothing less than “an attempt at creating a model for the New Kanazawa through urban planning.”

While the city and the prefecture together were involved in planning, it was the central government, through the agency of the Home Ministry 内務省, that was ultimately responsible for approving it. However it must be stressed that the ministry did not as a rule, with the exception of Route 2, undertake the actual planning: while a telegram sent the day after the fire from the ministry set forth certain “points to note” (chūiteki shōkai 注意的照会), the plan itself was decided at a joint meeting of the prefectural and city officials, including the mayor and governor.

A concrete example of this can be seen with the 300-tsubo (992 square meter) plaza the city had originally intended to build in the middle of Route 1 that would serve as a park, a firebreak, and a place to dump snow in the winter. Budget reasons forced its cutting, but it is interesting to note that while final permission, as always, had to be gained from the Home Ministry, the ministry itself did not interfere and left the final decision up to the city. With respect to the construction of roads linking the burned area to Musashigatsui, also, while the Home Ministry acknowledged the necessity and gave its approval, and indicated that it would be ready to allow bonds to be issued to finance construction of connections to the main areas, the final decision was the city’s. This indicates that the ministry took the role of general supervisor, and did not act as the party responsible for designing the actual plan itself. It gave permission, but did not control planning per se. Thus the local governments of regional centers were able to design, within reason, the cities they wanted.

Images of the New Urban Ideal

The opening decades of the twentieth century saw a building boom in the major cities of Japan. Tokyo Station was completed in 1914, bringing a central focus to the modern office area that was developing in the Marunouchi district, and at about the same time the Nakanoshima area in Osaka began to be developed. The various laws regarding urban development—the Urban Planning Law, the Urban Architectural Law (shigaichi kenchikubutsu hō 市街地建築物法), and the Road Law (dōrō hō 道路法)—were all promulgated in 1919. They were designed to cope with the new urban development boom, as well as to alleviate some problems inherited from the Meiji and Edo periods. This combination of development and legal codification created a new image of the city, one espoused by urban theorists-cum-politicians (or urban theorists-cum-bureaucrats) such as Gotō Shinpei, Seki Hajime 関一, and Kataoka Yasushi 片岡安. These men formed various groups concerned with the development of the city and urban planning, such as the Municipal Study Group (Toshi Kenkyūkai 都市研究会, founded by Gotō, 1917) and the Kansai Architectural Society (Kansai Kenchiku Kyōkai 関西建築協会, founded by Kataoka, 1917). The journal The Municipal Review (Toshi kōron 都市公論), published by the Municipal Study Group, promoted many of their ideas, with active cooperation from the government—many senior bureaucrats contributed articles. Seki, a former professor at Tokyo Upper Commercial School (now Hitotsubashi University) who was invited to become Mayor of Osaka based on his expertise in urban planning, described in his Toshi seisaku no riron to jissai 都市政策の理論と実際 (Theories and Practice of Urban Policy) how the “French style” of urban design—wide boulevards and
an emphasis on visual appeal, urban design for the elite—was giving way to “London style,” which stressed practicality and distributed power (ぶんざんしゅぎ 分散主義). Seki’s emphasis on correcting urban problems of poverty and housing, however, did not affect the design ethos for the new Hikoso area. Kanazawa’s planners went forward with a clear extension of the ideal of wide roads and modern buildings that city councillors had championed for the earlier main roads when the tram was put through a few years earlier. With its grand straight boulevard striking up the middle of the residential area, it was purely in what Seki would have termed the French style, a symbol of the power of the state apparatus to create a new Japan.

The New Hikoso

The newly-redeveloped Hikoso areas became a showpiece of modern urban design. The new buildings of the area, with their fireproof slate roofs, and their modern Western or Western-influenced design, were held up as an “ideal rebuilding” and thus symbolic of the New Kanazawa and of the wonders of urban planning. Its impact on the residents was part of its planning ethos from the start, designed to increase acceptance of government control through the creation of “ideal citizens” awed by the new spaces being created. For this reason, there was a strong aspect of showcasing to the Hikoso rebuilding, both in the design and how it was described in the media. For example, the Yokoyasue-chō shopping street residents, also hit by the fire, formed a committee to look into development plans, and one of the key elements they wanted was the removal of the “bleak” (殺風景 sappūkei) telegraph poles and the setting up of an avenue of elegant bell-shaped streetlamps down the street, which would be a first for the city. This was done expressly for the purposes of creating an attractive space in order to promote development.

In addition, Professor Hoshino Tetsuo 星野鉄男 of Kanazawa Medical University called on the city to set up a “Housing Consultation” department to encourage the building of modern “scientific” housing, with features such as good ventilation and lighting and insulation, to prevent illness, especially consumption—the incidence of which was very high, ranking the city as one of the worst in the country for this disease. Hoshino noted that for such a large-scale change, such a chance would not come again. A housing consultation department could be a valuable asset for Kanazawa and a model for other cities. He also called for standards for roof slopes to improve the area’s physical attractiveness. Further, his vision would allow no factories to be rebuilt in the area. Yokoyasue was to be commercial, Hikoso proper to be residential, and factories were to be relocated to industrial zones as part of the new urban image.

A year after the fire, the headline for an article about Yokoyasue-chō area was: “A Year Today, Splendid Reconstruction Carries on Apace, the Building of a Forest of Tall Towers and Grand Buildings (大廈高楼林立て); People Walking About the Site of the Disaster are Amazed.” The article goes on to discuss how “fifty-four out of fifty-eight sections in Yokoyasue-chō are now being busily rebuilt, and thanks to the passionate efforts of the residents, houses so splendid that it looks totally different are being built. The newly-paved three-ken (5.4 meters) road lined with a forest of tall and grand buildings of three or four stories is truly an ideal reconstruction. Rows of slate roofs and a great Western-style bathhouse not seen before the fire, and appropriate ‘culture houses’ (文化住宅) are also being built, stunning the people who walk around the site of the disaster.”
While the Yokoyasue road was only widened to three ken (5.4 meters) rather than the four-and-a-half or five (8–9 meters) the residents had originally hoped for, they still managed to create a street lined with tall and grand buildings. Interestingly, the phrase “a forest of tall towers” is almost identical to the expression “a forest of [multi] layered towers” (sōrō rinritsu 層桟林立) used by Tokyo Governor Matsuda Michiyuki 松田道之 in his famous “Problems of Delineating the Central Area of Tokyo” (Tokyō chūō shiku kakutei no mondai 東京中央市區劃定之問題) of 1880 that set the ideal image of a modern prosperous downtown.

The Hokuriku Mainichi ran a number of articles on the rebuilding a year after the fire. It commented on the contrast between the types of houses being built: red-tiled bunka jūtaku side-by-side with low Japanese-style houses. Route 1, with its new Western-style buildings, was described as a “new leap” to the future “overflowing with valor” (minai ni egakitsutsu atarashii hiyaku e no yűki ga afureteiru 未来に描きつゝ新しい飛躍への勇気が漂ふてゐる), and “the dark and depressing (aniutsu 暗鬱) shopping street that Yokoyasue-chō road was is now vibrant with bright feelings, and is so busy at night that it could be called the Asakusa of Kanazawa, or the Shintenchi of Kanazawa.”50 The new urban space thus is seen to become the cultural center of the city and the locus of its development into a major urban area. That this was seen as an essential part of the modern city can be shown from a comment made by the head of the Industrial Section of the City Office on the occasion of the Emperor Shōwa’s enthronement in 1929. A shopping street “which competes for the convenience of customers is now an essential aspect of the modern city (kindai toshi no ichi jōken 近代都市の一條件),” he declared, and he called for the establishment of another similar urban space in Tate-machi 坂町51 so that Kanazawa might have “shopping streets like other cities.” As added essential features, he brings up bright lighting and a roof to keep the rain and snow off. These would all help Kanazawa’s urban image, especially with respect to how it compared to other cities, a perennial concern. A final comment on the new urban landscape can be found in the guidebook “New Scenes of Kanazawa” (Kanazawa shin fūkei 金沢新風景), written by the chief writer at the Hokkoku shin bun in 1933. He says of Hikoso that “if it were not for the Depression, this could be the best district in Kanazawa.”52 Fig. 3 below shows the final shape of the new urban landscape, prior to tarsealing in the early 1930s. It was the widest road in Kanazawa, with footpaths on either side, and lined by trees.

Despite this wonderful modern image and the high hopes placed on it, the Hikoso area failed to become a central part of modern Kanazawa, and remained little more than a show-piece of urban planning. The great central Route 1 came abruptly to a dead end.53 However, although Hikoso may at this stage have been little more than an expensive advertisement for the wonders of modern urban design, it did have another purpose. Urban planning, with its massive upheavals of people and resorting of land, required self-sacrificing citizens who would willingly Resettle for the good of the city. These were the same sort of citizens who would dedicate themselves to the state when needed. They were what the urban bureaucratic elite termed “ideal citizens” (risō shinmin 理想市民). How the creation of such compliant citizenry was achieved, and how the citizenry in turn was able to have a voice in the top-heavy bureaucratic process of urban planning, is the focus of the next section.
Calls for Civilian Cooperation

The connection between urban bureaucrats and their desires to create “ideal citizens” has been noted by several researchers. As Narita Ryūichi has commented, the modern nation-state is noted for its imposition of an “equalized space” (均一化された空間) that used rules and regulations in space to control and equalize its citizens. Urban space—and thus urban planning—was used to shape the citizens of Japan: modern cityscapes were to bring about modern civilians.

Gotō Shinpei’s “Eight Hundred Million Yen Plan” (八億円計画) stemmed from his desire to transform Tokyo into an “imperial center” (帝国の中枢) that would concentrate of domestic and global knowledge and wealth in one place, allowing, through modern science, a “national mobilization.” Loyalty to the state, especially before the Russo-Japanese War, was often more symbolic than real, and it was imperative that citizens be made to see the greater goals of the city above their own individual interests. For this reason, the creation of “ideal citizens” formed a central part of the ideology of the modern nation-state. From the 1920s, this was an increasingly emphasized item on the agenda of nationalistic elements in the urban elite, as can be inferred from examination of the “Citizens’ Readers” (市民読本), books that stressed the relationship between the city and the citizen. Kanazawa’s was published in 1928. Its grandiloquent introduction begins thus: “Where the Kaga Plain reaches its southern edge, the great city (大都市)
大都) that develops around the old castle and the pure waters of the Sai and Asa [sic] Rivers is our beloved (shin’ai naru 親愛なる) Kanazawa City. The character comprised of the traditional power of the Million [Koku] Fief of the House of Maeda, and the serious diligence and industry of the citizens, has made it into the cultural center in both name and fact of the Hokuriku.” 57 These remarks, with their look back to the past and the growing idea of the large or great (dai 大) city, and their acknowledgement of the role of ordinary citizens, are typical of early Shōwa discourse concerning civic patriotism. The Kanazawa Reader later uses Aristotle’s “Man is a Social Animal” (Politics I.2) quote to promote concepts of social unity. 58 The clear intent was to reinforce the notion that citizens were to obtain complete happiness based on their relationship with the state unit (the city), an idea that would become increasingly prevalent in the discourses of urban development in the 1930s, when the heavy hand of state imperialism emphasized conformity and compliance.

**Industrial Growth and Urban Problems**

The period from the post-Russo-Japanese War Hibiya Riots to the Taishō Political Incident (Taishō seisenn 大正政変) and the Siemens Incident (Shīmensu jiken シーメンズ事件) has been characterized by Miyachi Masato as one in which urban social instability was at a peak, brought on by the sudden rise of Japanese capitalism in the early twentieth century. 59 During World War I and immediately after, the increasing social activism of the working class, led by labor groups such as the Ōyakai 友愛会, resulted in the number of strikes rising from a mere fifty in 1914 to a whopping 497 in 1919, although there was a sharp decrease after that. 60 In the post-war slump of the 1920s, urban social problems intensified. The government tried to counter the growing labor movement through means such as the 1923 Peace Preservation Law (implemented from April 1925) and the mobilization of local bodies and military reservists. Nationwide, hundreds of thousands were laid off as factories closed and production slowed. At the same time, many shopkeepers and other members of the lower middle classes became actively involved in protesting high taxes. Despite the decline in the number of strikes after 1920, it was still seen as a time of considerable potential unrest, due to increasing organization of labor and growing political consciousness—especially after the 1918 Rice Riots—in cities, and so the creation of compliant ideal citizens was a matter of some importance. 61

In addition, Japanese urbanization increased significantly after World War One, leading to an ever-more urgent need for proper urban planning. The export-led economic boom during the war years, when Japanese industry took up the slack of European factories that had been converted to war use, led to a strong growth in urban industry. For example, in Kanazawa the gross industrial product leapt from fourteen million yen to nearly sixty million yen, an increase of over 400 percent. The amount of goods shipped from the station nearly doubled during the war period, from 44,787 tons in 1915 to 85,085 tons in 1919. Population increase was from 128,660 in 1914 to 156,279 in 1918, 62 and the urban population of Ishikawa prefecture as whole jumped from 20.9% in 1913 to 24.8% in 1918, the biggest single jump in Kanazawa’s population during any four-year period of the first quarter of the twentieth century. 63 Nineteen banks opened in the World War I period, nearly double the previous total. This rapid urbanization created numerous problems, including poor housing conditions, extortionate rents, and over-crowding.
Creating Modern Cityscapes and Modern Civilians

These urban problems, common to all large cities in Japan at the time, were well known to the intellectual and leaders of Japan. Kawakami Hajime’s 1917 “Tales of Poverty” (Binbō monogatari 貧乏物語) is one of the more famous responses, but others such as Seki Hajime, who became mayor of Osaka in 1923, were also concerned with the problems of urban development, and better placed to be able to do anything about it. The idea of urban reform and the need for urban planning was not in itself controversial among Japan’s leaders. However, as Nogawa points out in his study of civilian responses to post-earthquake Tokyo redevelopment, it was not practically possible to reconstruct urban spaces along modern urban planning lines without the compliance of the local residents, and therefore considerable effort was put into gaining their trust and cooperation. The same need for citizens’ cooperation faced Kanazawa’s leaders after the Hikoso Fire.

After the Fire

Hikoso was a fairly well-off area, largely middle-class and above. Generally, the victims of the fire were in a position to start rebuilding promptly, and they did. Those who began quickly, it is not surprising to observe, rebuilt according to the former property lines. This was a problem for the authorities, who desired to use the opportunity of reconstruction to at least double road widths. To prevent residents from going forward with immediate rebuilding, city and prefectural administrators invoked the Urban Architectural Law. Article 15 of that law required the permission of the prefectural governor for rebuilding within three months. Citizens swiftly came to realize that permission would not be granted to individual applicants until the authorities had completed a comprehensive plan for the whole of Hikoso. It served as a disincentive to those who had intended to reconstruct right away—they could not be sure that street and property lines would be unchanged. And violators would have their building stopped or even torn down. Application of the Urban Architectural Law thus gave the city some breathing space to draw up new boundary lines. The extra time would enable the city to create a coherent, planned, urban landscape.

Another issue on which civilian understanding was required was the financial burden imposed on those who would benefit from the changes: the Urban Planning Law required that those who benefited from the new spaces should help pay for them, under the betterment levy (juekisha futan 受益者負担) system.

Because of the very high projected cost of construction, especially in the unaffected areas, the city wanted to issue bonds (kisai 起債) to pay for it, a move which required Tokyo’s permission. Without this, they would need to rely on increasing taxes—housing tax etc—which would not be popular. While the city government was considering introducing the betterment levy to relieve the burden on general residents, the urban planning committee was not impressed at the idea of making people who had lost their homes and belongings suffer further.

A number of taxes were proposed to help repay the bonds, including added commercial taxes and prefectural taxes, which were expected to cover some ¥278,300, but Yoshikawa Ichitarō 吉川一太郎, the vice-mayor (joyaku 助役), noted that “it is unfair to force all the citizens to pay for the restoration of one damaged area,” and proposed that they be limited to no more than 20 percent, or some ¥56,000–57,000 in total. He did note that the Home Ministry was eager for the betterment levy to be imposed to some extent, “for the future” (shōrai no tame 将来のため), an apparent attempt at the central government end to get the
citizens to understand the link between taxation and the creation of modern urban landscapes. Yoshikawa noted that “as a city, we are keen to use the betterment levy system,” but he also questioned the method: “but we first need to determine whether the fire-affected people can stand this or not; this is the most basic problem.” His conclusion, however, was that “as the Urban Planning Law is predicated on (gensoku toshite 原則として) applying betterment levy, we should levy some amount.”

By mid-May final costs had been worked out, with ¥383,806 allocated for land purchases, and ¥218,161 for financial assistance for relocation, two-thirds of which was needed for Route 1. Most of the costs would be raised by selling bonds, and so the city applied to the Treasury for a loan of ¥700,000. The city government intended to borrow ¥200,000 in low-interest loans from the Postal Insurance Office (kan'i hoken-kyoku 簡易保健局), which was all the office would allow them; ¥300,000 in low-interest loans from the Treasury’s savings department (yokinbu 預金部); and the rest, another ¥200,000, would be filled by a loan from the Industrial Promotion Bank (Kangyō Ginkō 勧業銀行). By looking at examples in other prefectures, the betterment levy was seen to be normally around 30–40 percent. Since the widening of the secondary roads was caused by the fire’s destruction rather than direct pre-laid plans, it was determined by the city assembly council (shikai kyōgikai 市会協議会) that the betterment levy would be levied only on those residents who lived along the new roads, not the ones that were merely widened. As Yoshikawa noted, “this city cannot possibly demand this rate,” and required that it be kept as low as possible. He did note, nevertheless, that “there are few new roads in the new road network in this city and so it would probably be relatively easy to levy this charge, thus it would be logical to do so wherever possible.”

By mid June the total budget had been finalised at some ¥790,000, or ¥774,500 leaving out the costs of roadside tree maintenance. This was to be paid for by a combination of low-interest loans and beneficiary levies, and city residents were only to taxed additionally for the repayments of the principal and interest that the betterment levy did not cover. At 7.2 percent, this would mean ¥55,000 a year needed to be paid, and the goal was to have it all repaid by 1937, in ten years. The rate for the wider roads (using six ken rather than five as the cut-off) was raised at the end of June to between a quarter and a third of construction costs, and new roads to a full third. Roads that would be made more than three times wider would be considered as “new” roads. For the burned areas alone, the first two years would be a grace period, and then collected for three years after that without interest.

The final budget and distribution of beneficiary levies was not announced until December. For Route 1, the widest road, there were three zones set, each 20 ken (36.4 meters) deep from the boundaries of the road itself. Zone 1, from Fukuro-machi (the street closest to Musashigatsuji) to the start of the new road, was set at 60 percent. Zone 2, covering the next short block, up to Oke-chō 桶町, was set at 25 percent, and the rest, all the way to Iwane-machi at the far end, was Zone 3, and rated at 15 percent. This shows a very clear and swift reduction in rank based on the proximity to the main commercial area of Musashigatsuji. Similarly, Route 2 was divided into two zones, each 17.5 ken (31.8 meters) deep, centered on the junction with Route 8. Zone 1, closer to the station, was rated at the same 60 percent as Route 1’s Zone 1, and Zone 2, covering the eastern side as far as Hikoso 1–banchō, was rated at 25 percent. This was no small amount of money, and to get the affected residents
to comply without protest was an important aspect of the city government’s emphasis on the greater good.

The issue of the building lines clearly shows how Kanazawa administrators attempted to elicit citizens’ acceptance of top-down direction by an appeal to the greater good. In the city’s Guidelines for Rebuilding the Fire-Affected Areas (Saigaichi no kenchiku-jō no kokoroe 災害地の建築上の心得), published on 1 May, public-spirited self-sacrifice was asked for: “With this recent fire, there is a strong connection to the urban planning street system. Therefore we must await the decision of the Minister, and until then it may not be possible to allow building. However, we feel this is unavoidable in order to create a public good.”

The Guidelines also noted that “the chance to rebuild the city in the fire area is exactly what ‘turning bane into boon’ means. Because of this chance to renew the appearance of the district easily and rapidly and gain for our city structure the most pleasant and healthiest and most economical reform and in the end achieve the wonderful goal of group living (shūdan seikatsu yūshū no bi o sumasan to suru 集団生活有終の美を済さんとする) we thus beg the indulgence (shoki suru 庶幾する) of the residents of the entire city and especially the affected areas to be thus inspired (happun 発奮).” The inconveniences to be endured by the Hikoso residents were thus painted not only as for their own long-term good, but also as for the good of the entire city.

The prefecture made similar appeals. When the governor, Shirane Takesuke 白根竹介, returned from Tokyo on 26 April after calling at the Home Ministry and Imperial Household Ministry, he reported, “On presenting myself at the Imperial Household Ministry on the 25th, I met with the Minister and the Permanent Secretary and expressed my gratitude, explaining the extent of the destruction with an open map. Now everything has been approved.” He then made his plea for citizens’ cooperation: “I am sure that the area will become greatly improved when everything is completed, so at this point I would like to ask for the sincere understanding of the landowners regarding the urban planning project, and while there may be three months to wait for building [on the road boundaries] those areas that are not connected with roads will be given permission swiftly.”

This was far from the only call for understanding and cooperation from landowners, and almost certainly reflects concerns about the possible emergence of the kind of opposition that Tokyo administrators had encountered when remodelling that city after the Great Kanto Earthquake. There were more than a few people in Hikoso who were unhappy at losing all their land and being forced to relocate in an entirely different place. However there is no record in the newspapers or official archives of any actual resistance activities in Kanazawa. The question as to why there was not is complex, too complex for me to treat satisfactorily in the present essay, but a few points can be noted. Kanazawa people were characterized at the time as having a particularly strong regard for the government (kanson minpi 官尊民卑), an attitude usually attributed to habits acquired during the long period of prosperity under the strong and generally benevolent rule of the Maeda. Thus Kanazawa residents were generally amenable to government dictates, as seen in the very favourable reaction to the tram system in the Taishō period, which required hundreds of people to move or remodel their houses; there is only one person recorded as having opposed this to the extent of requiring eminent domain regulations to be enforced. In addition, migration into Kanazawa played a much smaller role than in Tokyo or the five other biggest cities; it was largely from surrounding regions rather
than from other parts of the nation, and thus local identification was stronger. Whether be-
cause they were long accustomed to the kanson minpi mindset or for other reasons, Kanazawa
residents seldom rose in revolt. Nevertheless, the city government did not take its citizens’
cooperation for granted.

On the first anniversary of the fire, Mayor Sagara Ayumi 相良歩 called on the citizenry
to help complete the work, saying, “While this current urban planning project may only be
a small area, it is the first part of [doing it in] the entire city, and thus is a test for the citizens
(shimin no ichi shiren 市民の一試練). Luckily, land purchases have been completed without
the need for [the city to invoke] eminent domain, which pleases me more than anything, but
I would ask for a concerted effort to complete the task, and I ask that even after the com-
mencement of construction, residents in the area fully understand [the meaning of] urban
planning.” Here again we see the emphasis on “understanding” or acceptance. Following the
city’s lead is justified on grounds that the plan goes beyond the confines of the Hikoso area to
affect the city as a whole. Hikoso residents are called on as citizens to endure the trial for the
sake of the entire city’s urban planning future.

Civilian Voices in the Reconstruction

The discourse on urban planning in Kanazawa was not entirely one-sided, with all
the speakers coming from the ranks of city and prefectural officialdom. It is important to
note that while the residents were generally accepting of official direction, they were by no
means mindless drones. Just as local government, while generally following central govern­
ment rules, had its own opinions and goals, so too did local citizens. In the rebuilding of
the Hikoso area, the interest and involvement of local residents in the planning process is
shown most clearly in the debates surrounding the Route 2 extension. The city’s initial plan
was limited to building new wide roads in the areas affected by the fire. City officials’ modest
goal was conditioned by concerns that it might not be easy to win approval for a bond issue
that would be necessary to pay for a more ambitious plan, and moreover they were inclined
to proceed with caution in implementing the new Urban Planning Law. Their initial plan
did not include construction of a connection to the river and Ward Seven, nor—in an even
greater omission—did it provide for any connection to the busy intersection of Musashiga-
tsuji. This provoked dissatisfaction. Taking note of public opinion (yoron 輿論), the planning
committee later changed its mind to include areas of town that had not burned—though
only as far as the Asano river. The limits on the committee’s vision largely reflected the
state of municipal finance, and when the decision was made to extend the new road, this
did increase the need to persuade local residents of the benefits of the new plan. As initially
conceived, the main Route 1 plan had no provision for a bridge across the river; the road was
to stop at the edge. Unless and until it could be extended across the river and on to meet with
the main Hokkoku-kaidō, it was nothing more than a very wide dead-end.

Despite this, its potential as urban space was clear. The director of the Kanazawa Elec­
tric Tram Company, for one, recognized how it would impact his plan to expand his network
into the new street. When complete, the extended road would enable trams to connect di-
rectly with the northern side of the city and bypass the Owari-chō area. But even incomplete,
he felt that it served a large enough area to justify spending a hundred thousand yen or so. He
noted too that “a road that cuts diagonally across a checkerboard layout (gobangata 碁
As noted earlier, the Home Ministry, concerned about providing access to the station, had asked for an additional 10.5-ken (19 meters) road intersecting the main twelve-ken road, and known in the plans as Route 2. After intersecting with Route 1, the road called Route 2 changed its name to Route 7 and carried on to the river bank (see Fig. 2). However its width also changed, dropping down to four ken (7.3 meters). Therefore local residents argued for the widening of Route 7 to allow better access from Hikoso and central Kanazawa to the areas on the far side of the Asano river (Ward Seven in the prewar ward system). Some forty people banded together to form the Extension Establishment Association (Enchō Kisei Dōmeikai 延長期成同盟会), and, together with three local city councillors, presented their case to the mayor. The details were expounded in the *Hokkoku shinbun* of 15 May:

Kobashi-machi 小橋町, Asano-machi 浅野町, Mizuguruma-machi 水車町, each of the Higashi Baba-machis 東馬場各番丁, Hiraori-machi 平折町, Tatsugawa-chō 立川町, Kami Maki-chō 上牧町, Shimo Maki-chō 下牧町, Moriyama-chō 森山町, Hikoso Banchō 彦三番丁, Horo-machi 母衣町, and Iwane-machi 岩根町 areas have formed a group for the extension of the 10.5-ken road to Kobashi Bridge. On the morning of the fourteenth, forty supporters went with Council Members Kosaka 小坂, Amai 天井, and Kagaya 加賀谷 to the city office to meet with Mayor Sagara and discuss the issue. The four-ken road is far too narrow to link the 10.5- and 12-ken roads to the far bank, therefore they requested an extension of the 10.5-ken road. This would mean another 50 ken (91 meters) length for the 10.5-ken road and cost some forty or fifty thousand yen.

Kosaka, Amai, and Kagaya, the three councillors who joined with local residents in bringing the appeal to the mayor, were all representatives of Ward Seven, across the Asano river. Ward Seven was one of the poorer areas of the city, home to many small workshops pounding out the gold leaf that was one of Kanazawa’s principal products. The debates over the tram system had energized the political will of the Ward Seven residents just a few years previously, and such workers and day laborers had played a major role in the 1918 Rice Riots in Kanazawa. The complaints of Ward Seven residents, thus, were not an issue the city council and planners could sweep under the carpet. The issue transcended party politics—two of the councillors were from the Rikken Seinentō 立憲青年党, and one was from the Seiyū Hontō 政友本党. The suggestion for widening the current four-ken (7.2 meters) plan was approved by the city assembly council and passed on to the urban planning committee for formal amendment. At this stage, however, the city government was not very keen on the idea, since it felt that “it is clear that the ministry is likely not to agree.” Matsue, the city’s chief civil engineer, had attended the Urban Problems Conference (*toshi mondai kaigi* 都市問題会議) in Osaka, and while there had taken the opportunity to speak with someone from the Home Ministry. He reported back to his Kanazawa city colleagues that the ministry was opposed to the city council proposal: “Even if we amend it, the Home Ministry is not going
to grant permission, so it is not likely that it will be possible to widen the road.”

Despite this pessimism and the opposition of the ministry, the question was debated on 31 May at the Urban Planning Committee meeting, where Kosaka of Ward Seven rose to argue that in the city council there was a “passionate desire for the extension of the ten-and-a-half-ken road.”

However, Tada Itarō, a Seiyūkai member of the Prefectural Assembly and former Assembly Council member, was not so enthusiastic. While agreeing in principle, he noted that “just expanding a mere fifty-three ken is not much of a problem, but this single instance of widening will have an affect on the entire plan [for the city], which will mean some problems concerning finances.”

Notably, having an eight-ken road leading up to the bridge would demand a future eight-ken road be built in Ward Seven leading away from the bridge. In other words, since the plan for restoring of the burned-out area was not just confined to the Hikoso district, but had been drawn up as part of a master plan for the city as a whole, too much small-scale change would disrupt the overall scheme. Nevertheless, the calls for some decent connection to Ward Seven could not be ignored. With the city planning committee seeming to hesitate to make a definitive commitment to a longer, wider road, and with members such as Tada voicing doubt, some kind of alternative proposal was needed to avoid an impasse. Former mayor Iio Jirōsaburō put forward a compromise plan: the road could be widened from four to eight ken, which would double the existing width and allow easy access to Ward Seven across the existing Kobashi bridge. By cutting the width down from twelve or ten-and-a-half ken, the city could afford to make the road a little longer. The final extra amount needed was a little over ¥30,000—another ¥20,115 in construction costs, plus approximately ¥10,000 in compensation and removal costs for the part of the roadway that had not been affected by the fire. This was rather less than the original estimate of as much as ¥50,000, and it meant that the total budget, including provisions for sidewalks on both sides of Routes 1 and 2, and the maintenance of the roadside trees—all part of the new urban streetscape ideal—came in at under ¥800,000.

The visions of urban planning that Hikoso represented—in opposition to the Home Ministry’s original wishes—were finally realized, although not on the grand scale that some had imagined. It was through the actions of local residents and the lobbying of local politicians, and not only because of decisions by bureaucrats directed by central government policy, that the reconstruction plan took its final shape. Local interests were able to play an integral part in modifying the overall urban infrastructure of Kanazawa, albeit a rather smaller and more limited role than might have been ideal. It was, after all, the image of the modern that the city leaders and the opinion-makers were primarily focused on, and thus Hikoso’s primary role, until such time as the rest of the network could be completed, was to demonstrate the benefits of modern urban development to the citizens, to show them what awaited them in the future—if they were willing to accept the costs.

Concluding Remarks

Urban planning was a large-scale project that both created new spaces and demanded new ideas of citizenship that fitted in with the nation-state of post-Meiji Japan. As such, its ramifications went beyond the mere redevelopment of feudal cities into capitalist ones, and affected the relationship between urban residences and the lived space of the city. In Kanazawa, there was an added dimension, a feature of citizens’ consciousness of the slow decline of the city’s relative importance in the country. For residents of the old Maeda castle
town, urban planning was not merely a process for deciding where and how to build roads; it was also a means to another end, a return to civic pride and position.

The city was, in the words of Narita Ryūichi, a place “to set examples”—from the legalistic and social order concerns of the Meiji period, the city’s “exemplary” (hanchū 範疇) aspect was being reformulated to enforce acceptance of a capitalist, consumerist society. At the same time, urban planning was also used to “attack definitively ‘individualism/the individual’”—the situation where the state and society began to split apart in the latter half of the modern period. Urban planning, with its emphasis on top-down power, large-scale projects, and the importance of the city over the individual, the group over the person, can be seen as a reaction to this. The references to “public morals” (kōtoku 公徳) in the media, iterated again and again when officials and politicians were calling for understanding, were thus directed at this need to create public-minded civilians, and to overcome “city thinking” and “individualism.”

Thus the reconstruction of Hikoso was not merely the rebuilding of part of the city. It was a teaching tool, its grand boulevard an advertisement to the populace of the advantages of modern urban design, and by extension the modern state. Kanazawa, dreaming of reattaining its former glory, was ripe for anything that could promise this, and its citizens eagerly followed the city administration’s goals—but not blindly. While there was no active resistance, there were voices calling to be heard, demanding that the city extend the new development into the poorer Seventh Ward. Thus, although the end result was a compromise, this process shows how local input could affect the way in which the Urban Planning Law was carried out in practice, adapting to local needs. Despite the fact that the process privileged the bureaucrats, with no formal provisions for the ideas of local residents to be included, citizens did manage, through use of the political apparatus—local councillors—to see that their wishes were considered and, at least to some extent, heeded. In the end, while its immediate effect on the wider urban transport infrastructure was limited, the city leaders got their impressive boulevard, the local citizens of Ward Seven got their wider road, and local ideals and ambitions found their own voices in the chorus of national development.

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Ishida 2004

Ishizuka 1991

Kanazawa Kyōiku Linkai 1994

Kanazawa-shi Kyōiku Kai 1928

Kanazawa-shi Shi Hensan Linkai 1998

Kanazawa-shi Shi Hensan Linkai 1999

Kanazawa-shi Shi Hensan Linkai 1999
Kanazawa Shōkō Kaigisho 1925

Katō 2001

Kamoi 1933

Kostof 1991

McClain 1982

Miyachi 1973

Morimura 1999

Motoyasu 2002

Motoyasu 1998

Narita 1993

Nogami 1994
Nogawa 2002


Nogawa 2006


Olsen 1986


Ono 1928


Seki 1936


Sorensen 2002


Sumitomo 1998


Takagi 1960


Takahashi 1993


Tanaka 1966


Tsuda 1929 (2003)

NOTES

1 See for example Narita 1993 or Morimura 1999 for ideas of the “invisible made visible” through urban design or monuments.
2 Fujitani 1996.
3 Motoyasu 2002, p308.
5 The very heavy influence of European urban design on Japan has been frequently noted by previous researchers, with the early designs for the remodelling of Tokyo being perhaps the most well-known example. While these were never completed, and the physical street layout of Japanese cities tended to resist major change, the concepts were still important. Nor were the ideas of power and vista new to Japan—Miyamoto Masaaki 宮本雅明 discusses it in Zushū Nihon toshi-shi (pp. 174–175), for example, using the examples of how streets were aligned to not only allow watchers in the castle towers to observe the residents, but conversely, so that the residents walking along the streets would constantly be aware of the castle looming up ahead. For the redevelopment of European cities that served as examples for Japan, see for example Olsen’s The City as a Work of Art: London, Paris, Vienna, Girouard’s Cities and People: A Social and Architectural History, and Kostof’s The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings Through History.
6 By “urban elite” I refer to a group of civic and business leaders, intellectuals, and other opinion leaders. Essentially, this group comprises the people who participated in the 1930 Hokkoku shinbun-organized conference on Kanazawa’s development, and who contributed articles and opinion pieces to the Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce, as well as council members. Opposed to them, the “middle classes” are the largely voiceless masses who had no direct political clout, though as seen in the Route 7 episode, they were not without influence as a group. The distinction is in some ways arbitrary, but the basic difference is that the “urban elite” were those who controlled, or attempted to control, the development of the city, and the “middle classes” (and lower) were those that they referred to as needing “education” or “compliance”—the general “shimin.”
7 Sorensen 2002, p. 99. Baxter 1994 also discusses how central authority imposed, or attempted to impose, its will on the early Meiji Ishikawa prefecture through for example the powers of the prefectural

8 There is a great deal of literature on the development and history of castle towns in Japanese, starting from Ono Akira’s 1928 classic, Kinsei no jōkamachi. Tamai Tetsuo and Yamori Kazuhiiko have written extensively on the spatial structure of castle towns, and Yoshida Nobuyuki is one of the main current authorities on social organization of castle towns, particularly Edo. Kanazawa’s castle town history has been most thoroughly researched by Tanaka Yoshio (see, for example, Jōkamachi Kanazawa). In English, see McClain 1982.

9 The road networks of castle towns were hierarchal in nature, with the “kaidō” 街道 being the most important regional route through the city, followed by the “ōkan” 往還, the main secondary routes connecting the castle town and its hinterland, the “kandō” 幹道 main internal routes, and the rest. In Kanazawa’s case, the Hokkoku-kaidō was the most important route, running through the main commercial areas close to the castle. Three ōkan (Ishibiki, Tsurugi, and Miyakoshi) connected the city with surrounding districts. There were twenty-five main routes in the city, but the bulk of roads in Kanazawa were minor roads (42,434 ken [77 kilometers] of major roads (average width 2.25 ken), 62,092 ken [113 km] of minor roads (average width 1.5 ken), although the total areas of each type were largely similar). See Kanazawa Kyōiku Iinkai 1994 for details.

10 Hokkoku shinbun, 10 January 1899.

11 “Shin Kanazawa wa kensetsu saretari” 新金沢は建設されたり, Hokkoku shinbun, 1 January 1919. The topic was the desirability of putting in a tram system, considered a vital must-have for any self-respecting modern city.

12 This was done as part of the general downsizing following the Washington Conference. It was short-lived, however: the army returned the following year after the city delayed doing anything with the site, and local shopkeepers and businesses suffered loss of custom. See for example the petition to the city council of March 1926 in Kanazawa-shi shi shiryōhen 12, p. 618.

13 See the “Shimin no koe: Kanazawa-jō seki riyō hōhō” 市民の声―金沢城跡利用方法 series in the Hokkoku shinbun from 12 to 22 April 1925. The bulk of the opinions were for a park, with perhaps a library or gymnasium for the ideals of mens sana in corpore sano, or other education facilities. Some wanted it to be for housing, and one person even suggested using it as a ski area in winter.

14 Ibid., 15 April 1925. Another similar opinion called for keeping the highest point of the castle as a strictly controlled inviolable space (fukashin no jōiki 不可侵の浄域), to be used for citizens’ festivals and “spiritual education” (seishinteki kyōyō 精神的教養) and flying either the national or city flag (ibid.). The idea of the castle as the spiritual center of the city was clear.

15 Ishizuka 1991, p. 16. Ishizuka also describes urban planning from the Meiji to Taisho eras as a “dark age” (ankoku jidai 暗黒時代).

16 Ikeda 1930, p. 16.

17 Ibid.

18 Kanazawa Shōkō Kaigisho shobō 36, January 1925.

19 “Toshi keikaku hōshin: naimu tōkyoku no dan” 都市計画方針・内務当局の談, Hokkoku shinbun, 22 June 1918.

20 Lecture details and contents are taken from the Hokkoku shinbun, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 June 1923.


22 Lead article, Hokkoku shinbun, 22 April 1927 (evening edition).

23 “Shukka gen’in wa rōden-setsu ga yūryoku” 出火原因は漏電説が有力, Hokuriku Mainichi shinbun, 23 April 1927.

24 Details regarding the fire itself and the extent of destruction are taken from Shōwa ni-nen shigatsu Kanazawa-shi kasai shorui 昭和二年四月金沢市火災書類 (1927), the Hokkoku shinbun and
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Hokuriku Mainichi shinbun of 22 April 1927 (evening and day editions), and Shōwa ni-nen Hikoso taika to ibō, kyūgo jikyo 昭和二年彦火大と消防・救護状況 in Tsuda Yoshio 津田義雄, Sōkō Kanazawa shōbō kasai enkaku-shi 草稿金沢消防火災沿革史, reprinted in Kanazawa-shi shi shiryō-hen 12, Kindai 2, p. 212


26 The Hokuriku area in general is highly susceptible to foehn winds, dry air that has been heated adiabatically (through pressure) as it descends over mountain ranges and atmospheric pressure warms it. This particular one was measured at a bit over 15 meters a second, or some 55 kilometers per hour.

27 “Kanazawa-shi taika” 金沢市大火, Hokkoku shinbun, 22 April 1927.

28 Ibid.

29 “Kotoshi ni natte sanjūsankai: itsuka ni ichido no kaji” 今年になって三十三回、五日に一度の火事, Hokkoku shinbun, 3 May 1927.

30 “Kasai hoken wa hyakugojūman en gurai” 北海道は百五十万円位, Hokkoku shinbun, 22 April 1927.

31 The Ordinary Budget (futsū kaikei 普通会計) of Kanazawa in 1926 anticipated ¥1,488,435 in income, and ¥1,695,454 in expenditures (that is, a current-year deficit). Both figures are about a third of the totals for the year, the rest being made up of the Extraordinary Budget (rinji kaikei 臨時会計).

32 “Kaku chō betsu no songai” 各町別の損害. Hokkoku shinbun, 22 April 1927.

33 The Urban Planning Law was promulgated in 1919 from the Tokyo City Renewal Regulations, and originally was only applied to the six main centers of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe. However lobbying by other cities meant that its focus was expanded to twenty-five major cities (nineteen regional cities plus the six largest ones), of which Kanazawa was one. There was considerable public discourse in the media and in the city council about what the Urban Planning Law would mean and how it could affect the city. Further discussion of the Urban Planning Law in English is found in Sorensen, particularly chapter 3, and in Japanese in the works of Koshizawa Akira 越沢明 and Ishizuka Hiromichi 石塚裕道. A thorough analysis of the Law from a legalistic point of view is found in Takagi 1960.

34 “Jukkenhan dōro wa hatashite hitsuyō nari ya” 十間半道路は果して必要なりや. Hokkoku shinbun, 5 May 1927.


36 “Toshi keikaku dōromō ni motozuki kōkaku seiri o dankō” 都市計画道路網に基き区画整理を断行, Hokkoku shinbun, 23 April 1927.

37 “Shōshitsu kuiki o ōdan suru dōromō an no daikansen o tsukuru” 焼失区域を横断する道路網案の大幹線を造る, Hokuriku Mainichi shinbun, 23 April 1927. Notably, the original plan, shown in the Hokkoku shinbun on the same day, does not show Route 2.

38 “Kenchiku sen no kettei” 建築線の決定, Hokkoku shinbun, 9 May 1927.

39 “Kisai wa yurusare, hisaichi dōro kakuchō mo dankō” 起債は許され、非災地道路拡張も断行. Hokkoku shinbun, 8 May 1927. Note that although the Home Ministry was more lenient, it nevertheless did not allow bonds to be issued under fire restoration, but under the Urban Planning Law.

40 The same thing would happen to Kataoka, who, since he was originally from Kanazawa, was invited to become Mayor in the mid-1930s specifically to oversee the amalgamation of neighboring municipalities to create Greater Kanazawa (Dai-Kanazawa). The definitive text on Seki and his Osaka in English is Hanes 2000.

41 Seki 1936, p. 113.

42 For example, when the tram was being planned, the mayor, Iio Jirōsaburō, commented more than
once on the importance of the city's looks (bikan: 美観), as did the city councillors—notably when it came to replacing the old and worn-out wooden Saigawa Bridge, the southern entryway to the city, with a modern steel and concrete construction that could support the tram. The bridge was seen as the gateway to the city, and its symbolic importance was emphasized. As was the importance of having main thoroughfares that countered the impression of outsiders that Kanazawa people were forced to "rub shoulders" in the streets.

43 The City Administration had decreed in 1909 that within ten years all the boarded roofs (roofs with boards weighted down by stones) were to be replaced with non-flammable materials like tiles. However, before that decade was up, city councillor Futaki Nisaburō 二木二三郎 pointed out the problems of materials cost inflation and lack of workers: “With the effects of the European War [World War I], construction materials have undergone a considerable increase, and with the building of the tram there is now a serious shortage of workmen, requiring the city to import them from other areas and thus it is not possible, at this stage, to reroof all houses in the city without importing workers” (Hokkoku shinbun, 9 Sept 1917, from a memorial submitted to the city council). At least as late as the 1920s, wood-boarded roofs were still common in Kanazawa. A survey carried out in September 1918 noted that there were still 10,693 houses in Kanazawa with “completely non-fireproof roofs” and 5,402 with “partially non-fireproof roofs” (Hokkoku shinbun, 14 Sept 1918). The reason Kanazawa houses were not generally tiled during the Edo period was that they often had to carry an immense weight of accumulated snow in winter. The weight of heavy wet Hokuriku snow added to tons of heavy clay tiles was simply too great for most structures to bear.

44 Literally, suzuran-shiki 鈴蘭式, or shaped like the lily-of-the-valley flower, a round blossom with flaring wave-shaped edges that hangs downwards in clusters.

45 In fact, the local edition of the Osaka Asahi shinbun ran an article in 1927 entitled “The dark Hokuriku is cursed: The World’s Top Graveyard” discussing how Japan’s death rate was the highest of world powers, and Hokuriku the highest in Japan. Consumption and other respiratory diseases were the biggest killers of urban dwellers, with 40% of youth (15 to 24) dying from consumption alone. "Kurai Hokuriku wa norowashii sekai-ichi no hakaba" 暗い北陸は呪はしい世界一の大墓場, Osaka Asahi shinbun (Ishikawa-ban), 2 July 1927.

46 "Kekkaku no su kara dete: kindai toshi no risōteki jūtaku e" 結核の巣から出て、近代都市の理想的住宅へ, Hokkoku shinbun, 24 April 1927.

47 "Shōshitsu chitai ni wa kōjō fukkō yurusazu" 焼失地帯には工場復興許さず, Hokkoku shinbun, 25 May 1927.

48 This refers to a style of domestic architecture that was popularized in the interwar period. Designed for a more Western-style mode of living, and to combat the dark and unsanitary conditions of traditional deep and narrow townhouses, they developed in the late Taishō period and became popular after being displayed in the Tokyo Peace Memorial Expo of 1922. The word "culture" was very much in vogue during the Taishō era, applied to such disparate things as knives and baths, and had connotations of new, modern, and appropriate for the increasingly westernized lifestyle of middle-class Japan. See for example Uchida 2002 and Yasuda 1992 for details of theories and plans for modern bunka housing.

49 “Kyō Hikoso taika isshūnen” けふ彦三大火一周年, Hokkoku shinbun, 21 April 1928.

50 “Hikoso no taika yori kyō, isshūnen o mukau” 彦三の大火よりけふ、一周年を向ふ, Hokuriku Mainichi shinbun, 21 April 1928. Asakusa and Shintenchi were at the time the respective downtown leisure areas of Tokyo and Osaka.

51 Currently a trendy shopping street for youth, far more so than Yokoyasue-chō.

52 Kamoi 1933, p. 21.

53 While Hikoso remained a dead end due to budgetary limitations, the planned connection with the Hokkoku-kaidō to the north was completed after the war. The fact that it was unable to be completed
at the time was secondary to the need to use the opportunity of the fire to commence construction, and
so in place of, or rather in addition to, its traffic role, the main Hikoso road was therefore seen by the
city council and planners, as well the media, as an advertisement for the potential future.


58 Ibid., p. 21. The attitude of the state leaders concerning how citizenry should behave during the
prewar years was very much in keeping with Aristotle’s formulation, “The proof that the state is a cre­
ature of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and
therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole” (Politics, I.2).


60 Fujii et al. 1979, p. 205. Of the 497 strikes in 1919, 400 were for wage increases. From 71 wage
strikes in 1916 to 304 in 1917, this shows the flip side of the war boom. While wage increase demands
rapidly tapered off after 1919, demands for reduction of labor hours peaked with a massive 38,444
people joining strikes in 1921 (see the chart in Fujii et al., p. 204) This figure was caused by the massive
strikes of 1921 in the Kansai region, culminating in the Kobe Kawasaki Mitsubishi strike in July 1921,
the largest pre-war strike in Japan with some 35,000 participants (“Gekika suru rōdō sōgi”激化する労働争議, in Igarashi et al., 1999, p. 243). While wage demands hit their peak with nearly 60,000 people
joining strikes in 1918, after a higher number of strikes with fewer people in 1919 they rapidly tapered
off. Labor reduction hour strikes, on the other hand, grew from 6 in 1918, and 141 people, to 68, and
close to 40,000 people, in 1921 before sharply dropping off. Social unrest was a very real worry of the
urban elite, particularly where the working classes and the left wing were concerned.

61 For a general overview of urban life and civil actions (minshū undō 民衆運動), see Hashimoto 1976
and Fujii et al. 1979. I am also grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers of this work for directing my
attention to the changing patterns of labor unrest in the interwar years. While it is true that a regional
and only lightly industrial city like Kanazawa did not suffer from large-scale labor unrest, the possibil­
ity was nevertheless a concern of the city council and business leaders. In particular military reservists
and other groups were often called in to break strikes—one group was the Dai Nippon Kokusui Kai 大日本国粹会 (Fujii et al. 1979, p. 206). In the 1920s, with the formation of such groups as Zenkoku
Suheisha 全国水平社 and Nihon Keizai Renmei 日本経済連盟, labor unrest took on a more organ­
mized, more political form, combating the growing levels of unemployment (Fujii et al. 1979, p. 207). In
the cities, among the middle classes, opposition to taxes (notably, commercial taxes [eigyō zei 営業税])
was high (Fujii et al. 1979, p. 216).

62 These figures are taken from the 1919 Kanazawa City Statistics (Kanazawa-shi tōkeisho 金沢市統計書), published by the city. The value of exports through the station more than doubles during the same
time, from ¥130,820 to ¥276,042. The population figures, which put Kanazawa at ninth nationwide,
refer to resident population rather than registered (honseki 本籍) population, which only increased
by about 4,000 during the same period. This pattern is typical of labor movement: workers moving
to the city to work in factories without formally registering their new residence. Economic prosperity
(for some) went hand-in-hand with a rise in prices (for all), most famously in rice (the Rice Riots of
1918) that was to contribute to a post-war slump. Unpolished rice, for example, shot from an average
of ¥12.59 per koku in 1915 to ¥46.93 in 1919. It is to be noted, however, that in Kanazawa, at least,
the Rice Riots were not about obtaining rice per se, but about obtaining domestic rice at “reasonable”
prices (see Nogawa 2006 for details on the Rice Riots in Kanazawa).

63 Population percentage figures are based on Hashimoto 1976, pp. 310 and 311.

64 Nogawa 2002, p. 151.
The description of Hikoso being “middle class” is from “Risaisha wa chūsan ijō, fukkō wa hayakarō” 罹災者は中産以上、復興は早からう, Osaka Asahi shinbun (Ishikawa/Toyama-ban), 22 April 1927: “The burned area was largely middle-class and above housing” (shōshitsu chitai wa daitai chūsan kaikyū 烧失地帯は大体中産階級以上の住宅). Also note the observation “The affected area is relatively well off (bikakuteki yūfuku 比較的裕福), so rebuilding has therefore been started quickly” (“Fukkō wa angai hayai” 复興は案外早い, Hokkoku shinbun, 22 April 1927).

The city set forth three rules regarding rebuilding at this time: (1) Permission of the prefecture is required for building on the affected sites. Those who fail to get permission will be punished and have their buildings razed. (2) No building that does not comply with the urban planning road network and building lines will be given permission. (3) Persons wishing to build on inner areas must consult with their neighbors and build an access road of not less than nine shaku [2.7 meters], and must comply with building lines. These were printed in newspapers on 24 April.

A coherent urban landscape was not of course a new or “modern” goal, as screens and paintings of Edo and Kyoto as well as other cities in the Edo period reveal. In fact there was considerable effort spent on creating impressive cityscapes, with vistas to distant mountains or the castle, and with imposing architecture. See for example Miyamoto Masaaki’s descriptions of Osaka and Edo in Takahashi 1993, pp. 204–207.

The idea of such forms of quasi-taxation was not new of course. Local governments even in the early Meiji era were often forced to come up with ways to raise capital as standard taxation increasingly went to serve national interests. For examples in early Ishikawa prefecture, see Baxter 1994, esp. pp. 186–193 (“The Financing of Prefectural and Subprefectural Government”). Urban planning was one way in which ostensibly central practices and laws could be seen to have a direct benefit and impact on the local areas—more so than police or government official salaries, at any rate. Baxter also extensively discusses minpi 民費, local taxes that were raised either to cover local services or to make up shortfalls in central or prefectural funds (Baxter 1994, p. 109–114). These were a clear forerunner of levies such as the betterment levy.

According to the Hokkoku shinbun, such permission was almost guaranteed, due to sympathy over the disaster “Jūniken kansen dōro,” Hokkoku shinbun, 24 April 1927.

“Taika fukkō kisai”大火復興起債, Hokkoku shinbun, 27 April 1927.

“Shōshitsu chitai seiri to juekisha no futan”焼失地帯整理と受益者の負担, Hokkoku shinbun, 29 April 1927.

“Kisai wa yurusare, hisaichi dōro kakuchō mo dankō”起債は許され、非災地道路拡張も断行, Hokkoku shinbun, 8 May 1927.

Ibid.

“Juekisha futan wa tashō nariyomote chōshū suru”受益者負担は多少なりとも徴収する, Hokkoku shinbun, 15 May 1927.

“Sanbun shite kariru saigai fukkō keikaku”三分して借りる災害復興計画, Hokkoku shinbun, 25 May 1927. The Kangyō Ginkō was as a governmental institution, founded in 1897, that provided long-term loans under the Nippon Kangyō Bank Act of 1896, based on debt securities rather than deposits.

“Kukaku seiri ga hijō ni mendō da”区画整理が非常に面倒だ, Hokkoku shinbun, 9 June 1927.

Yoshikawa, quoted in the Hokkoku shinbun of May 15, notes that in other cities, the rate for new roads is a third, that for widened roads a quarter (“Juekisha futan wa tashō nariyomote chōshū suru”受益者負担は多少なりとも徴収する, Hokkoku shinbun, 15 May 1927).

“Saigaichi fukkō keikaku shinsai”(災害地復興計画申請), Hokkoku shinbun, 17 June 1927.

“Juekisha futan wa tashō nariyomote chōshū suru”受益者負担は多少なりとも徴収する, Hokkoku shinbun, 15 May 1927.

Kanazawa shikai kaigiroku, 20 October 1927.
80 “Juekisha futan-an kettei” 受益者負担案決定, Hokkoku shinbun, 24 June 1927.
81 “Yakeato juekisha futan” 焼跡受益者負担, Hokuriku Mainichi shinbun, 24 December 1927.
82 “Risaichi no kenchikujō no kokoroe” 罹災地の建築上の心得, Hokkoku shinbun, 3 May 1927.
83 Governor from September 1926 to May 1927; his replacement was Yokoyama Sukenari 横山助成, who held the post until November of that year. Prewar government-appointed governors generally held the post for only a very short time, no more than a year or two, before they were replaced.
84 The reason for his visit to the Imperial Household Ministry was in connection with a donation by the emperor for relief work. As regent, Hirohito had visited Kanazawa in 1924 to observe the army’s Hokuriku Manoeuvres and, as the Osaka Asahi shinbun (Ishikawa/Toyama-ban) noted, “had received a great impression of his imperial visit to Kanazawa City. As a result his heart has been much moved, and he has generously contributed funds for charity.” (“Gokyūjutsu-kin kashi wa hakaku, yakeato ni toshi keikaku-hō tekiyō” 御救恤金下賜は破格、焼跡に都市計画法適用, Osaka Asahi shinbun (Ishikawa/Toyama-ban), 27 April 1927). The emperor was not the only giver of charity, of course. A fundraising drive gathered ¥24,918.86 by early June, of which ¥17,000 was from the Hokkoku shinbun, and Marquis Maeda gave ¥3,000 to help out his ancestral hometown. (“Taika gienkin niman yonsen en ni noboru” (大火義捐金二万四千円に上る), Hokkoku shinbun, 9 June 1927.
85 Quoted in “Gokyūjutsu-kin kashi wa hakaku, yakeato ni toshi keikaku-hō tekiyō” 御救恤金下賜は破格、焼跡に都市計画法適用, Osaka Asahi shinbun (Ishikawa/Toyama-ban), 27 April 1927.
86 For details of this opposition, see Nogawa 2002 or Ishida 2004, chapter 5.
87 “Yakeato no seiri de shikichi o ushinau osore” 焼跡の整理で敷地を失ふ恐れ, Hokkoku shinbun, 14 May 1927.
88 Which is not to say never—the 1918 Rice Riots affected Kanazawa as well. For the most recent analysis of the Rice Riots in Kanazawa, see Nogawa 2006.
89 “Kyō Hikoso taika isshūnen” けふ彦三大火一周年, Hokkoku shinbun, 21 April 1928.
90 “Saigai dake no kakuchō wa muigi: hisaichi no dōro mo kakuchō seyo” 災害だけの拡張は無意、非災地の道路も拡張せよ, Hokkoku shinbun, 5 May 1927. “Naimushō-gawa no iken de jukkenhan dōro mo shinsetsu” (内務省側の意見で十間半道路も新設). Osaka Asahi shinbun (Ishikawa/Toyama-ban), 28 April 1927.
91 “Naimushō-gawa no iken de jukkenhan dōro mo shinsetsu” (内務省側の意見で十間半道路も新設), Osaka Asahi shinbun (Ishikawa/Toyama-ban), 28 April 1927.
92 Ibid.
93 At the time, the Seiyū Hontō, with ten seats, and the Kenseikai, with fourteen seats, dominated the city council. The Rikken Seinentō was the smallest political grouping in the council, with six members, and also had the poorest average councilors, with an average of ¥23 in city tax paid, compared to the ¥155 of the Seiyū Hontō, the richest. Thus it is not surprising that the poorer Ward Seven had support from the Rikken Seinentō. See Kanazawa-shi shiryōhen 12 kindai 1, pp. 311, 325.
94 “Kobashi made no jukken-han dōro enchō” 小橋までの十間半道路延長, Hokkoku shinbun, 31 May 1927.
95 “Iyoiyo hiraita toshi keikaku iinkai” いよいよ開いた都市計画委員会, Hokkoku shinbun, 1 June 1927. There were no city council meetings during this time, however, so the extent of this support cannot be fully known.
96 Ibid. Tada, notably, was not a Kanazawa resident, and his opposition may reflect the fact that he himself had no personal stake in the matter, nor was he representing anyone who did.
97 “Kobashi-sen enchō to shumushō no ikō” 小橋線延長と主務省の意向, Hokkoku shinbun, 2 June 1927.
98 “Saigaichi no jigyō yosan” 災害地の事業予算, Hokkoku shinbun, 2 June 1927.
要旨

近代都市空間と近代市民の創出―金沢における1927年の「彦三大火」復興と都市計画法の実施に関して―

ジェレミー・D・フィリップス

都市計画法の導入後、まず取り掛かるようになった金沢市彦三大火の復興事業を取り挙げる。市当局にとっては、既存空間を貫く幅広い主要道路を建設することにより、従来の狭隘なる都市空間を一新させ、近代都市計画からなる都市空間及び交通網の理想を実行する機会になったが、それはまた、住民に都市計画（都市空間の近代化）的重要性と利点を伝える機会にもなった。更に、比較的貧困な第七区と連絡する第二号線の延長問題にみられるように、地域住民にとっても、この復興事業が自分達の住む地域を活性化させる絶好の好機であったといえる。また、市当局としては、今後の都市計画法実施の前提として、金沢において公徳精神のある市民性を浸透させねばならなかった。そのため、市民の理想像の適応を試みたのである。袋小路として建設された彦三大通りは、まさに都市計画法の格好の見せ場となったのであり、その意味で、彦三一帯における都市計画は、単に近代的都市空間の創出に止まらず、都市計画法を受容する側の市民に対しても大きな効果があったといえる。